Divergent Strategies: Edison Gardens and Tacolcy Economic Development Corporation, Miami, Florida by Von Hoffman, Alexander
Cornell Real Estate Review 
Volume 1 Article 6 
7-2002 
Divergent Strategies: Edison Gardens and Tacolcy Economic 
Development Corporation, Miami, Florida 
Alexander Von Hoffman 
Joint Center for Housing Studies 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/crer 
 Part of the Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Von Hoffman, A. (2002). Divergent strategies: Edison Gardens and Tacolcy Economic Development 
Corporation, Miami, Florida. Cornell Real Estate Review, 1, 82-106. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Cornell Real Estate Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Commons. For more information, 
please contact hotellibrary@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Divergent Strategies: Edison Gardens and Tacolcy Economic Development 
Corporation, Miami, Florida 
Abstract 
Editors Note: Urban redevelopment has seen a dramatic revitalization in the last two decades, especially 
with the creation of Community Development Corporations (CDCs) and HOPE IV. Unfortunately, 
successful development in Urban environments are still more the exception then the rule. While many 
major cities have seen a dramatic revitalization of their urban cores, the creation of low and moderate 
income housing solutions have dramatically lagged the overall booming housing market Many of the 
failures of CDCs to successfully develop can be traced directly to the long standing complaint that the 
funding process is too lengthy and too complicated. In addition the entire process is often bogged down 
in the capricious administration of government funding programs. In the following case study Alexander 
von Hoffman discuses many of the issues that confronted a CDC operating in Miami. 
Keywords 
Cornell, real estate, Economic Development Corporation, Miami, Florida, urban development, community 
development, Local Initiatives Support Corporation 
This article is available in Cornell Real Estate Review: https://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/crer/vol1/iss1/6 
Cornell Real Estate Journal
June 2002
Editors Note: Urban redevelopment has seen a dramatic revitalization in the last two decades,
especially with the creation of Community Development Corporations (CDCs) and HOPE IV.
Unfortunately, successful development in Urban environments are still more the exception then the
rule. While many major cities have seen a dramatic revitalization of their urban cores, the creation of
low and moderate income housing solutions have dramatically lagged the overall booming housing
market
Many of the failures of CDCs to successfully develop can be traced directly to the long standing
complaint that the funding process is too lengthy and too complicated. In addition the entire
process is often bogged down in the capricious administration of government funding programs.
In the following case study Alexander von Hoffman discuses many of the issues that confronted a
CDC operating in Miami.
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Divergent Strategies: Edison Gardens and
Tacolcy Economic Development Corporation,
Miami, Florida
Alexander Von Hoffman
INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s the Tacolcy Economic Development Corporation (TEDC) of
Miami went from being a poster child to a problem child of the community
development movement. In 1982, under the guidance of an energetic Local Initia-
tives Support Corporation (LISC) program officer, a charismatic Miami policeman
named Otis Pitts founded the organization to help restore his beloved neighbohood
of Liberty City after the devastating riots of that year. With LISC's help, Pitts
redeveloped a bumed-out supermarket that the National Guard had patrolled
during the riots into the gleaming Edison Plaza shopping center, and LISC and the
national news media acclaimed Pitts and his organization as an example of what
community development could accomplish. Pitts then acquired a large site nearby,
where TEDC began developing the first new homes to be built in Liberty City in
decades. Again assisted by LISC, TEDC built five large housing projects, including
Edison Gardens, a garden apartment complex of 50 units (see figure 3 for a map
of the area). Financial problems began to plague TEDC, however, and the close
relationship between the rising CDC and the national intermediary began to break
down. Many TEDC projects lost money, especially Edison Gardens, which proved
to be poorly underwritten and expensive to maintain. LISC had approved the Edi-
son Gardens deal and worked with TEDC to salvage it. But inevitably misunder-
standings arose, and the relationship deteriorated between LISC program officers
and TEDC's directors, especially Lorenzo Simmons, the financial manager and
Pitts' successor as chief executive officer.
When the Ford Foundation announced it would scale down its support of com-
munity development organizations in Miami, Pitts and Simmons chose to pursue
an unorthodox strategy for funding TEDC's operations and projects. Instead of
relying on government or philanthropic grants as other CDCs did, TEDC formed
partnerships with for-profit firms to develop large-scale housing complexes far
from Liberty City. The fees and revenues from those projects—which produced
more than 1,000 units of low-income housing during the mid- and late 1990s—
allowed TEDC to survive and maintain its projects in Liberty City. Despite the
entreaties of LISC program officers, TEDC stopped participating in the major
financial support programs conducted by LISC that had provided it with crucial
grants, loans, and technical assistance during its formative years. In a twist on the
criticisms that intermediaries or their wealthy donors divert CDCs from programs
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that help local residents (Gittell et al. 1999; Rubin 1995; Stoecker 1997), Miami USC
urged TEDC to work in its home community, but the CDC insisted on collaborating
with wealthy private financial partners to develop housing outside liberty City.
This case study demonstrates that a weak nonprofit community development system
underlay TEDC's choice of strategy as well as LISC's slow progress in Miami. Without
a good supply of skilled practitioners in CDCs and enthusiastic confederates in sup-
port institutions—foundations, intermediaries, government agencies, and corporate
philanthropic community relations departments—nonprofit community develop-
ment cannot progress far or fast. The case of TEDC also indicates that the private
entrepreneurial approach to community development has great appeal, more so per-
haps than practitioners and students of nonprofit community development usually
realize.
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN MIAMI
Miami, in the words of LISC officer Sandra Rosenblith, is "a tough town" for com-
munity development. Unlike cities in which community development emerged from
the anti-poverty programs and black protests of the 1960s, community development
did not come to Miami until the 1980s. Riots provided the immediate catalyst for
revitalization efforts. In 1980 the acquittal of policemen charged with the fatal beating
of an African-American insurance agent, Arthur McDuffie, triggered violence that
resulted in 18 people dead, 1,100 people arrested, more than $80 million worth of
property destroyed, and damage to 240 businesses in the amount of $150 million. In
1982,1984, and 1989 riots again broke out in Miami's African-American neighbor-
hoods (Porter and Dunn 1984). Immigration to south Florida played a role in those
upheavals; Miami's poor African Americans resented the new arrivals. In 1980 the
Mariel boat lift brought approximately 125,000 Cubans to the United States and
introduced a large, unskilled, poor working-class Cuban population to Miami. The
Mariel immigrants created a striking contrast to the successful middle- and upper-class
Cubans who had come earlier to U.S. shores. In addition, some 60,000 Haitians arrived
by boat in south Florida between 1977 and 1981 (Portes and Stepick 1993; Russ 1999).
Convinced that the lack of African-American business entrepreneurs had caused the
riots, Miami's business and government leaders adopted a strategy of fighting poverty
by financing the ventures of inner-city business entrepreneurs, rather than nonprofit
community organizations. The chamber of commerce, Dade County officials, and the
Miami Herald crusaded to attract the Control Data Company, whose subsidiary, Urban
Ventures, had successfully implemented computer training and business develop-
ment programs in Minneapolis. The city's major corporations raised $7 million to
fund a business assistance center, which opened in 1982 and began offering loans and
technical assistance to current and aspiring small-business owners. In 1983 the City of
Miami created Miami Capital Development, a lending entity with a $6 million revolv-
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ing loan Rind intended to help businesses create jobs. In the Rish to begin the
process, however, the business assistance center and Miami Capital Development
failed to underwrite carefully, and local newspapers soon reported spectacular fail-
ures in the loan programs (Jones 1984; Martin 1999).
At the same time that local leaders embraced the entrepreneurial approach, USC
took an unusually direct role in launching a nonprofit community development
system in Miami. After the 1980 McDuffie riots and Mariel boat lift, Mitchell
Sviridoff, who was then starting LJSC, asked Sandra Rosenblith to go to Miami
and find ways that the new organization could promote community development.
Before joining USC, Rosenblith worked at the National Council for Equal Busi-
ness Opportunity, an agency funded by the Ford Foundation, she worked for two
years at the Federal Home Loan Bank, and she helped community development
groups in Mississippi and the South Bronx (Rosenblith 1999).
Starting virtually from scratch, Rosenblith hunched an eo^Kational and iecniitment
campaign for community development in Miami. She explained to business and
community leaders how CDCs operated and how they were funded. For those
who were interested, she led tours to other cities to observe community develop-
ment systems in action. Rosenblith forged an alliance with the deputy director of
the Dade County Office of Community Development, Ernest Martin, who em-
braced nonprofit community development and funneled CDBG funds to CDCs
(Martin 1999; Rosenblith 1999).
Eventually Rosenblith helped start three community development organizations:
TEDC, East Little Havana Community Development Corporation, and the Hai-
tian Task Force. She also established a network of private business leaders to
support community development. Because Miami lacked a tradition of support-
ing community development groups, Rosenblith gave more grants to the fledg-
ling CDCs than LJSC usually did. In addition, she hired a lawyer to establish the
new groups as 501(cX3) nonprofit organizations and brought in consultants to
help formulate strategic plans. Once the three CDCs were in operation, Rosenblith
worked closely with the inexperienced directors and their stafls to help create their
first deals (Pitts 1999; Rosenblith 1999).
In 1984 USC made Miami an area of concentration by opening a permanent office
in the city. To channel local money into community development, Rosenblith
organized a local advisory committee, which was led at first by Anthony Bums,
chairman and chief executive officer of the Ryder System, and subsequently by
James K. Batten, then president and later chief executive officer of Knight-Ridder,
Inc. Both companies maintained their headquarters in Miami. The committee also
had representatives of major regional banks such as Southeast Bank and NCNB
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National Bank of Florida.
In 1992 Sandra Rosenblith began a new assignment—starting a new rural program for
national LJSC—and started transferring control of the Miami office to her chief pro-
gram officer, Claire Raley. Raley became program director in 1994 and built on the
pioneering efforts of her predecessor by working with Miami IISC's existing CDC
partners while increasing the number of CDCs with which LISC did business
(Burnham 1999; Rodriguez-Tejera 1999; Simmons 1999b; Williams-Baldwin 1999).
Nor was LISC alone in promoting nonprofit community development. In 1985 The
Enterprise Foundation started Greater Miami Neighborhoods, a nonprofit housing
developer that later became an independent organization affiliated with Enterprise
(Enterprise 1993). Also active was Neighborhood Housing Services, a lending and
home improvement program of the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, which
had been operating a branch in Miami-Dade since 1973.
Philanthropic institutions also responded to Miami's social problems after the riots.
In the wake of the McDuffie riots, the Ford Foundation sent significant sums of
money to local CDCs and the Haitian Refugee Center. The Dade Partnership for
Community and Economic Development was established in 1989 largely with Ford
Foundation money and was administered by the Dade Community Foundation, a
leading philanthropy in south Florida. like the Neighborhood Development Support
Collaborative in Boston, the Dade Partnership for Community and Economic Devel-
opment distributed funds from member foundations, banks, and other businesses
to help pay the operating expenses of CDCs. For several years the Dade Partnership
contributed large sums to the three Miami CDCs LISC had helped establish (Perez
Camayd 1999; Portes and Stepick 1993).
The activities of the foundations and intermediaries helped promote political support
for community development in south Florida. Led by Miami mayor Maurice Ferre,
several leading officials in Miami, neighboring cities, and Dade County endorsed com-
munity development and inaugurated task forces to encourage CDCs to help rede-
velop low-income target areas such as little Havana, Overtown, Liberty City, little
Haiti, and the city of Opalocka. In 1981 the Florida state legislature passed the Com-
munity Development Assistance Act, which enabled the state to pay about $100,000 a
year to each of 15 CDCs for their operating expenses. Soon thereafter the government
of Dade County enacted a surtax on property sales to create a low-income housing
development fund, through which it began distributing revenues in about 1985 (Mar-
tin 1999).
Unfortunately, enthusiasm for entrepreneurial development and a lack of understand-
ing of nonprofit community development undermined government efforts. The
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Community Development Assistance Act, for example, established a revolving
loan fund to make loans to businesses—the entrepreneurial approach*—but pro-
vided no technical assistance to help new CDCs develop and cany out programs.
Responding to press criticism of the business assistance center, legislators placed
restrictive underwriting requirements in the state's loan program, making it diffi-
cult for CDCs to obtain loans. The state also adopted rules for allotting low-
income housing tax credits, which favor applicants that have site control, a building
plan, environmental assessments, and projects with large sites and numbers of
units. In practice, large private real estate developers are more likely to meet those
criteria than are nonprofit CDCs, which are unable to pay the large expenditures
(sometimes exceeding $ 1 million) that are required in the early stages of housing
development. Within Miami's city government, Mayor Ferre favored nonprofit
community development, but the more powerful city manager, Howrard Gary,
favored the entrepreneurship strategy (Bum-ham 999; Duran 1999; Martin 1999;
Perez Camayd 1999; Rodriguez-Tejera 1999; Rosen-blith 999).
During the 1990s Miami's emerging community development system lost mo-
mentum. The quality of corporate leadership suffered after James Batten died and
Knight-Ridder, Inc., moved its corporate headquarters out of Miami. First Union
Bank bought out Southeast Bank and moved its Headquarters out of town.
Indeed, corporate mergers and moves left Miami without a headquarters of any
Fortune 500 company, except Ryder Systems. The owners of Cuban-American
businesses were more inclined to support the arts and education than community
development efforts aimed at black urban poverty. In other cities LISC's local
advisory committees are composed of major financial institutions and philan-
thropic foundations, but in Miami the local advisory committee includes several
representatives of small- and medium-sized banks and businesses (as well as a few
large ones) and only one foundation member (Bumham 1999; Martin 1999).
In 1997 liSC took over the administration of the Dade Partnership for Commu-
nity and Economic Development, which it renamed the Dade Partnership Capacity
Building Program. By then, however, the amount available to each CDC had de-
clined to about $50,000 in operating support a year for three years. This decline
occurred partly because the number of CDCs receiving support iroeased and partly
because the initial Ford Foundation partnership grant had expired and not been
fully replaced by other flinders (Burnham 1999; Perez Camayd 1999).
like the city government as a whole, the city's CDBG program was highly politi-
cized and not well run. In the course of transferring control of the city government
from African Americans to Cuban Americans, deals were made by which CDCs
that had not demonstrated an ability to carry out programs received long-term
support. At the same time the city's bureaucracy became increasingly paralyzed as
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years of mismanagement took its toll. Finally, in 1995 the city had a $63 million deficit,
forcing the state of Florida to establish an oversight board to run the city. As was the
case in Washington, DC, such changes initially slowed down all agency activities until
the new regime took over (Martin 1999). Miami's CDCs also had problems. Some
failed. The Haitian Task Force, for example, fell apart because of dissension over the
election and overthrow of Jean-Bertrand Aristide as president of Haiti. Other CDCs
were poorly run, but because they had cultivated powerful political sponsors, the
government continued to support them instead of more productive groups. Survey-
ing the landscape in 1993, Bratt and her colleagues found that few of the more than 20
nonprofit housing organizations in Miami had developed multifamily rental housing
for more than four years, and these were primarily for the elderly (Bratt et al. 1995). By
the late 1990s, 43 CDCs existed in the Miami-Dade County area, but only about a
quarter of them were productive and at most 3 to 5 of them were in the top tier of
CDCs across the country (Burnham 1999; Jones 1999; Martin 1999).
Ernest Martin, a strong supporter of community development, retired in 1992 from
Dade County's community development department and was replaced by officials
who, put off by ineffective CDCs, returned to the policy of distributing CDBG funds
to infrastructure improvements rather than community development. In 1998, for
example, Dade County spent almost three-fourths of its $22.1 million CDBG funds
on administrative costs and public works, leaving the county's 40-plus CDCs to fight
for the rest (Burnham 1998; Mar-tin 1999).
Today a cadre of experienced housing and community development operatives and
officers of supporting institutions such as Greater Miami Neighborhoods, Legal Ser-
vices of Greater Miami, the Fannie Mae Partnership Office, and Greater Miami USC
are working to build public awareness of community development and create an
effective political coalition that can lobby for more favorable government programs.
Although these supporters of community development have lately made progress, it
is too early to judge whether they will finally create a viable community development
system.
THE LIBERTY CITY NEIGHBORHOOD
Located four and a half miles north and one and a half miles west of downtown
Miami, Liberty City was first developed and settled by African-American families in the
1920s. Many poor blacks lived in dilapidated shacks in the Overtown neighborhood,
the old African-American neighborhood located just north of downtown Miami, and
Liberty City offered them a chance to have better homes, especially when in the 1930s
the government built public housing in the area. White neighborhoods grew up
around the core area of liberty City until the 1950s, when whites began to move out
and were replaced by African Americans. In the 1960s whites continued to leave for the
suburbs, while urban renewal and highway construction projects in Overtown started
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another migration of African Americans into the Liberty City area.
liberty City experienced significant losses in the 1980 McDuffie riots. According to
a 1984 newspaper account, 53 businesses, many of them owned by whites, were
destroyed Twenty-three of the ruined businesses moved to other locales. Between
1,000 and 2,000 people lost jobs in the area. Damage estimates exceeded $100
million. In response, the federal government sent in $21.5 million in emergency aid
to help 229 businesses that were damaged during the riots (Jones 1984; Rosenblith
1999).
In recent years Liberty City fit the stereotype of the innerKityndghborhood beset
by poverty, declining population, social problems, and deteriorated housing. (See
table 2 on page 30 for neighborhood statistics.) Dade County's Office of Commu-
nity Development designated Liberty City and Model City (composed of unincor-
porated areas in Dade County outside Miami's borders but adjacent to liberty City)
as target areas for revitalization. Yet even as thousands of blacks moved to Liberty
City, both whites and blacks left in even greater numbers. Its porxilation decreased
by 18 percent during the 1970s, falling to 28,886 by the end of the decade. In 1980
another 37,273 people, 90 percent of whom were black, lived in the ac^acent Model
City. During the 1980s the population declined further both inside and outside
Miami. By 1990 Liberty City was home to a population of 26,500,95 percent of
whom were black, and the Model City area housed 31,311 people, 91 percent of
whom were black (Miami-Dade County Planning Department 1993,1998; TEDC
1985).
Despite the presence of middle-class residents, Liberty City had a large and growing
poor population. By 1990 the average household income was $18,438—less than
half the figure for Miami-Dade County as a whole. Forty^rueeperoent of all family
households had incomes below the official poverty line, and 33 percent of house-
holds received public assistance. The pforxxtionofrK^useh^^
was 38 percent, a much higher figure than the 15 percent recorded for all of Dade
County. liberty City contained a relatively high proportion of children: Nineteen
percent of the population was under 10 years of age, as opposed to 14 percent for
Miami-Dade. But about 61 percent of children under five years of age lived in
poverty and more than half of the children under 18 years of age were poor. (The
adjacent Model City had similar demographic and economic characteristics.) (Mi-
ami-Dade County Planning Department 1993,1998).
liberty City contains a mix of middle-class homeowners and impoverished rent-
ers. In 1990,68 percent of the housing stock was composed of single-family
homes and owners lived in 40 percent of all occupied units. But as might be
expected in an area plagued by riots and poverty, average housing values dropped
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during the 1980s and by 1990 lagged far behind Dade County's average ($47,629 as
opposed to $112,484). The average rent in liberty City, $272, was far below the $441
county average. The vacancy rate more than doubled in the 1980s, from 6 to 13 percent,
and by 1990,40 percent of vacant units were boarded up, eight times the average for all
of Dade County. Although some units were vacant, others were overcrowded. About
30 percent of all occupied units in Liberty City contained more than one person per
room; by comparison, the figure in Dade County was 18 percent (Miami-Dade County
Planning Department 1993).
TEDC
When Sandra Rosenblith of LISC began to look for likely candidates to start CDCs in
Miami, several sources, including people at the United Way, told her about Otis Pitts
Jr., a former Miami policeman who directed Belafonte Tacolcy Center, a liberty City
social services agency. (The first word in the agency's name paid tribute to the enter-
tainer Harry Belafonte, who had given a major grant to the organization; the second
was an acronym for The Advisory Committee of Liberty City Youth.) Pitts had grown
up in liberty City and was passionate about helping its people. While working for the
City of Miami's police department, he volunteered his time at the Belafonte Tacolcy
Center to start youth pro-grams. In 1974 he was named the center's director and in that
capacity helped restore the organization to financial health and institute numerous new
programs (Pitts 1999).
Rosenblith tracked Pitts down—not an easy task because the riots had made him a
person much in demand among foundations and government officials—and began
to explain the concept of community development. Pitts was intrigued and wanted to
know more. In response, Rosenblith provided a briefing that lasted two days
(Rosenblith 1999).
In 1982 after much thought and discussion—and trips to New York and Mississippi
to study community development firsthand Pitts and the Belafonte Tacolcy board
founded their own CDC, TEDC, to help rebuild liberty City. From the first, Pitts and
the TEDC board set their sights on attracting private investment to Liberty City to
provide jobs and businesses to African-American residents. In a 1985 brochure TEDC
stated that its mission was "to increase jobs, business opportunities and income for
the black residents of the area" by helping create "the infrastructure and environment
required to stimulate private investment and make the development process self-
fueling" (TEDC 1985,1). Two years later the organization published another booklet
stating that "TEDCs mission is to create an economic environment in the liberty City
neighborhood in which investment becomes a self fueling process" that would in-
crease "the availability and quality of goods and services, entrepreneurial and job
opportunities." Pitts had no illusion that making Liberty City a place where invest-
ment was self-sustaining would be an easy or quick task. "TEDC's mission is ambi-
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tious," he wrote, "and it is not expected to be fulfilled by TEDC alone or in the
near term" (TEDC 1987,1).
Pitts began the community development work by attempting to revive Liberty
City's languishing commercial corridor, Seventh Avenue. After surveying residents
and business owners along the corridor and in Liberty City, TEDC conceived a plan
to redevelop the site of the Pantry Pride Supermarket, which had closed after
sustaining severe damage from looting and fire during the McDuffie riot. Pitts
planned to replace the store with a shopping center. Rosenblith helped Pitts and
the TEDC staff prepare and submit applications to the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services and the City of Miami for funds to acquire the land for the
proposed Edison Plaza shopping center (Simmons 1999b). TEDC eventually
raised more than $2 million for the project from the federal, county, and city gov-
ernments; Miami Capital Development; philanthropies such as the ARCO Foun-
dation; Winn Dixie Company; and USC, which extended $322,500 in loans. Edison
Plaza's tenants included a Winn Dixie supermarket as the anchor, dry cleaner, phar-
macy7, beauty salon, and shoe store. The supermarket soon became one of the
most profitable of Winn Dixie's Florida outlets, demonstrating the viability of
inner-city retailing. A McDonald's franchise opened across the street and a new
shopping center with 10 small shops, a development Pitts had envisioned and
hope for. (USC 1984; Peirce and Steinbach 1987; Rosenblith 1999; Simmons 1999b;
TEDC 1985).
It is wrorth noting, in light of TEDCs later decision to reduce the community
representation on its board of directors, that the Edison Plaza project encountered
local opposition. At one of the opening celebrations, a local African-American
political leader criticized the shopping center project because the supermarket was
not owned by an African American (even though the shopping center and its other
shops were owned by African-American organizations or individuals). In the fol-
lowing years Pitts felt harassed by what he considers "political" or "ethnocentric"
community pressures to impose impractical demands, siich as the demand that he
hire an unqualified architect or construction company or hire unemployed people
as construction workers because they were local or African American. These de-
mands, he felt, could ruin the deals for TEDCs community development projects
(Pitts 1999; Rosenbiith 1999).
Nevertheless, the replacement of the devastated store by a thriving shopping center
soon made Pitts, TEDC, and Edison Plaza advertisements for the exciting possi-
bilities of community development. TEDC held a series of celebrations of the
opening of the shopping center, with local dignitaries presiding. In its annual
reports, LISC praised the project as "a dramatic turnaround," the journalist Neal
Peirce in Corrective Capitalism celebrated TEDCs accomplishments, and national
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news magazines and newspapers echoed the acclaim of the organization and its
colorful director (Hue 1989; LISC1986,4; Peirce and Steinbach 1987).
Pitts and the TEDC board members next turned to housing problems. They held
the shortage and the poor condition of the housing stock responsible for the out-
migration of African Americans from Liberty City. They reasoned that a declining
population would not be able to support the new businesses on Seventh Avenue.
Pitts and Lorenzo Simmons, then TEDC's financial officer, consulted with
Rosenblith about the practicality of and the proper strategies for developing hous-
ing. The TEDC staff found a feasible site on which to develop new housing for
liberty City: a six-acre parcel of vacant land two blocks from Edison Plaza owned
by Dade County (Simmons 1999b; TEDC 1985,1987).
With advice and assistance from Sandra Rosenblith, TEDC developed its first
housing project, Edison Towers, an eight-story apartment building containing 121
one-bedroom rental units. Before the development of Edison Towers, officers of
Southeast Bank (now First Union) told Pitts and Simmons they would give TEDC
a construction loan for the project if TEDC added an experienced housing devel-
oper to its team. In response, Rosenblith put Pitts and Simmons in contact with
Theo Rodgers, a private, low-income-housing developer in Baltimore. Rodgers
and TEDC formed Shell City Associates, a for-profit subsidiary, to develop and
manage the Edison Towers project. Ultimately, TEDC received financial support
from LISC, the Ford Foundation, Swire Properties, the Dade County surtax pro-
gram, Southeast Bank, and the social lending department of Equitable life Insur-
ance Company and completed Edison Towers in 1987 at a total cost of $5.5
million. It was the first low- and moderate-income housing project to be built in
liberty City in more than 20 years (Simmons 1999b; TEDC 1987,1990).
In the following years TEDC became an active housing developer with continued
assistance from LISC. Between 1989 and 1994 TEDC completed a total of 220
dwelling units in four housing developments—Edison Gardens I and II and
Edison Terraces I and II—on sites adjacent to Edison Towers. LISC provided
financing and technical assistance for all five of TEDC's large housing develop-
ments in liberty City. All told, LISC invested $1.5 million in loans, recoverable
grants, and grants in the operations and projects of TEDC during its first 12 years
of existence.
As the director of TEDC, Otis Pitts gained a national reputation for developing
projects in riot-torn liberty City. He was invited to join the national board of LISC
and was awarded a MacArthur Fellowship. In April 1993, after the destructive
Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida, Pitts was appointed deputy assistant sec-
retary for federal relief in Dade County for HUD, in which capacity he dispersed $3
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billion of federal funds for disaster relief, much of it to rebuild destroyed housing in
south Florida. In 1995 Pitts left that post and became vice president of Codina Devel-
opment, a private development company. Although no longer the president of TEDC
or involved in its daily affairs, Pitts maintained an active interest as the head of its
board of directors (Pitts 1999).
When Pitts went to work for HUD in 1993, Lorenzo Simmons, TEDC's financial
officer, assumed the position of president and chief executive officer. Previously a
financial analyst for IVIiami Capital Development and before that financial manager of
the Belafonte Tacolcy Center, Simmons had been hired by Pitts in 1984. The
organization's new leader believed in the same goal laid out by TEDC founder, Pitts:
to carry out projects that would help bring back businesses and residents to liberty
City. A successful TEDC, Simmons believed, would help realize his vision of stores
lining both sides of the Seventh Avenue commercial corridor, well-managed multi-
family residences behind the shops, improved single- family houses, amenities such as
swimming pools and recreation areas, and some small industrial enterprises to pro-
vide jobs to local residents (Simmons 1999a, 1999c).
Under Simmons, TEDC maintained its existing housing developments. The organi-
zation also continued to develop housing, but not in Liberty City and not with USC
funds. Between 1994 and 1997 TEDC pined with for-profit partners to develop 1,572
rental units in eight projects located in other Miami neighborhoods and south Florida
towns.
Besides real estate development, TEDC engaged in community development activi-
ties that reflected the economic theme expressed in its name and mission statements.
TEDC helped local landlords and merchants renovate more than 100 storefronts and
secured almost $265,000 worth of streetscape improvements in the commercial areas
of Liberty City. It aided 10 businesses along Seventh Avenue and owned and leased a
car wash business. In 1992, after the death of the owner of a fish market, one of the
neighborhood's longest-running businesses, TEDC opened a seafood market and
restaurant at Edison Plaza. TEDC continues to be interested in commercial real estate
development in liberty City and is helping develop a site for a national chain drug-
store, bringing in a new supermarket, and planning the redevelopment of Edison
Plaza (USC 1993; Simmons 1999d).
Throughout most of its history TEDC received more generous financial assistance
than other Miami CDCs. It attracted this support because it served the neighborhood
at the center of the 1980 riots and because its director was a well-respected and charis-
matic community leader (USC 1982; TEDC 1985). TEDC derived about 60 percent
of its operating expenses from grants and the rest from project revenues. Working
through the Dade Partnership for Community and Economic Development, the
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Ford Foundation contributed an annual grant that reached $200,000 to fund the
operations and programs of the fledgling CDC. In 1990 TEDC's operating budget
was $467,000, the foUowingyear it dimbed to $580,000, theyearafter it was $548,000,
and in 1993 it rose to $598,000. With such generous funding, TEDC was able to
slowly expand the size of its staff, which numbered six by 1992 (USC1992,1993).
Beginning in 1994 under Simmons's leadership, TEDC began to earn substantial
revenues from joint venture housing development projects and became less reliant
on philanthropic gifts. In 1997 TEDC lost the grants from the Ford Foundation
and Dade Partnership. Since then Simmons has run TEDC without major operat-
ing support from foundations, government, or intermediaries. Because of the
organization's debts and financial commitments, he reduced the number of full
time staff from six to three (TEDC 1999).
THE EDISON GARDENS PROJECT
During the late 1980s TEDC began developing Edison Gardens, a garden apart-
ment complex of 50 units, on another section of the block in which Edison
Towers stood. Edison Gardens was completed in 1989. (Edison Gardens II, a
similarly sized and shaped complex north of the original, was completed in 1991)
In developing Edison Gardens, TEDC functioned as the sole nonprofit developer
and relied on the kinds of financing sources CDCs often use to develop housing,
including nonprofit intermediaries and government agencies. Working closely with
Sandra Rosenblith again, TEDC obtained predevelopment loans from Miami
LISC, which it repaid as the project was completed. TEDC also made use of the
new Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program that Congress had enacted in 1986,
obtaining tax credits that were syndicated by IiSCs Neighborhood Endowment
Foundation(NEF). Edison Gardens was the first CDC project in Florida to use the
low-income housing tax credits. In addition, TEDC received permanent financing
from Dade County's surtax program and Homes for South Florida, a consortium
of banks that lent money to community development projects. Homes for South
Florida provided a 15-year mortgage at 11.5 percent for $905,000 as well as a 7-year
bridge loan at 10.5 percent for $903,000; the surtax program furnished a 30-year
mortgage at 3 percent for $1 million. Including the proceeds from the syndication
of tax credits by NEF, which repaid the bridge loan and interest, the total develop-
ment costs of Edison Gardens I and II were $3.7 million and $3.8 million, respec-
tively. (See table 1 on page 4 for project summary.)
TEDC's staff and consultants planned Edison Gardens carefully. The complex
was made up of four-story garden apartments grouped around an open-air land-
scaped atrium. Responding to the demand for larger units than the one-bedroom
apartments at Edison Towers, TEDC designed the apartments at Edison Gardens
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with two bedrooms. Each apartment had a large balcony, cross ventilation as well as air
conditioning, and wall-to-wall carpeting, and each came equipped with electric stove,
oven, and refrigerator. The complex included amenities such as secured parking, laun-
dry- facilities on each floor, tot lot, and basketball court (LISC 1993: Simmons 1999b).
Despite TEDC's impressive start and carefully planned projects, by the early 1990s the
organization was losing substantial amounts of money. A combination of mistakes
and bad luck caused its early projects to hemorrhage financially. During its first project,
Edison Plaza, the organization was involved in a dispute with a contractor that ended
in an arbitration decision TEDC lost. As a result, in 1988 TEDC had to pay $22,000 as
a down payment and $33,600 annually for 10 years thereafter. Even though it received
the start-up capital for the seafood restaurant from a government grant, like many
CDCs, TEDC was not able to operate a small business profitably. After estimating it
would cost $50,000 to launch the seafood business, TEDC actually invested S400,000
before closing the enterprise (LISC 1993; Simmons 1999b).
Among TEDC's most nagging financial problems was Edison Gardens, which drained
significant amounts of money. Although constructed successfully, this project en-
countered some of the crucial problems in financing and management that can plague
low-income-housing developments (Bratt et al. 1995). Edison Gardens was
overleveraged—it had too much debt per unit. It was an early tax credit project, and
neither LJSC nor the National Equity Fund—the organizations that constructed the
deals—knew at the time how the new tax credit program would work in practice.
Interest rates were high, and the equity invested was only 50 cents on a dollar, whereas
today it is more common for equity to be 70 cents or higher on a dollar. Because the
margin was so thin, management became much more important in making the deal
work (Rosenblith 1999).
Managing Edison Gardens, however, proved to be far more difficult than anyone
expected. When the buildings were opened for occupancy in 1989, TEDC hired the
Related Management Company, a group with extensive experience managing subsi-
dized apartments, to oversee the property. At the time Edison Gardens was devel-
oped, none of the officers of Miami LJSC, TEE)C, or Related Management Company
had any experience with projects funded by the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
program. The original provisions of the tax credit program required that tenants not
pay more than 30 percent of their income, adjusted for family size. In practice, that
meant family size and income, rather than apartment size, set the rents, which ranged
in 1992 from $384 to $506 (LISC 1993).
In trying to maintain adequate revenues for the project, therefore, Related Manage-
ment faced the dilemma created by the "two glass ceilings," maximum limits on rents
and tenant incomes, which project-based subsidies often impose (Bratt et al. 1995.
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162). The management company faced unpalatable alternatives. It could fill the
units at project rents by lowering its standards for accepting tenants, fill the build-
ings with families whose rents (set at 30 percent of their income) would not meet
the development s projected receipts, or let units remain vacant until ideal tenants
were located. Related Management decided to lower its screening standards, and as
a result, Edison Gardens soon experienced high rates of rental delinquencies and
disorderly tenants (LISC 1993).
Unhappy with Related's performance and perhaps hopeful of producing a new
revenue stream, TEDC started its own management company in 1991, Tacolcy
Property7 Management Company, to manage all its residential developments. The
new company was headed by a member of the TEDC staff who had little experi-
ence managing real property, but LISC and TEDC hired consultants to set up
accounting and management control procedures for the management company's
staff (LISC 1993; Simmons 1999b).
Unfortunately, Tacolcy Property Management Company inherited a difficult situa-
tion at Edison Gardens and could not find a solution. With dangerously high
vacancy and delinquency rates—only 35 of 50 units wrere occupied and half of
those were delinquent in rent payments—the management company decided to
relax the eviction policy. That move only resulted in further reducing revenues, and
in 1992 the complex of problems forced TEDC to write off more than $14,000 in
bad debts. Finally Tacolcy Management imposed a tight screening process and strict
eviction policy7 and began to benefit from new Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
regulations, wrhich allowed the size of a unit, rather than the size of the family, to
set rent levels. (Because of the new regulations, TEDC's subsequent and almost
identical project, Edison Gardens n, had a better record of rent collection.) (Bratt et
al. 1995; LISC 1993)
Adding to the difficulties at Edison Gardens, LISC and TEDC staff had underes-
timated the costs of operating the project at the time they arranged the financing.
They had realized there would be a shortfall, but planned to cover the gap with
excess tax credit syndication proceeds and a LISC recoverable grant of $85,000,
approved in 1988. In reality, however, the cost per unit was $3,000,50 percent more
than the projected $2,000 figure. The difference multiplied by the number of
units—the actual shortfall—was much higher than expected. The cost of main-
taining the property was increased by the failure to screen tenants as well as the
unexpectedly high real estate tax. None of the people who planned the Edison
Gardens project expected the property to be taxed near its assessed rate of $720 per
unit. TEDCs argument that subsidized low-income housing should not be charged
at the same rate as commercial market projects fell on deaf ears at Dade County's tax
department (LISC 1993; Simmons 1999b).
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To reduce the costs of Edison Gardens, TEDC, working with LJSC, decided to try to
refinance its major loans. It persuaded Homes for South Florida to refinance its per-
manent loan, originally $905,235 at 11 percent, with an interest rate of 9 percent LISC,
for its part, "took out" (repaid) the Homes for South Florida bridge loan, originally
$903,420 at 10.5 percent, with its own bridge loan of $310,639 at 6 percent, saving
TEDC $15,000 (USC 1993). Nevertheless, TEDC had to pour more than $200,000
into Edison Gardens to keep it afloat until it was refinanced. According to Lorenzo
Simmons, without die additional revenues that came from joint venture projects
outside libertyr City, Edison Gardens "would have tanked" (Simmons 1999b).
It is not uncommon for CDCs to have problems managing residential properties they
have developed, and frequently these problems are related to insufficient underwriting
(Bratt et al. 1995). Nor is it unusual for the nonprofit lenders to assist in the financial
'"work-out" and other management changes that will put a troubled project on sound
footing. That is what happened in the case of Edison Gardens. LISC, NEF, and
TEDC worked together to straighten out the problems that arose from their and the
banks' erroneous underwriting. LISC program officers, as shown by the takeout loan,
risked LJSC money, and TEDC staff learned from their experiences.
During the lengthy process of correcting these problems, however, the parties became
exasperated with each other. LJSC and NEF staff members worked for three years
with TEDC to improve the operations of Edison Gardens, but felt that TEDC staff
did not recognize soon enough that the management problems—bad tenants, dete-
rioration of property, vandalism—were preventing the project from getting out of its
financial difficulty. TEDC staff felt that because they were willing to accept the respon-
sibility for having made mistakes and did eventually hire a new property manager,
LISC and NEF could have spent less time criticizing them and instead could have
taken constructive action, such as writing off their loan on Edison Plaza (USC 1993;
Simmons 1999b).
TEDC's leaders grew alienated from the institutions that support community devel-
opment in Miami. Simmons balked at the program requirements USC and its equity
affiliate imposed, believing they were better suited to a young organization than an
experienced nonprofit developer. When NEF offered Simmons an equity deal for a
housing project in south Dade County with the proviso that TEDC funnel the pro-
ceeds back into Liberty City projects, TEDC rejected the offer and contracted with a
private syndicator. About 1995 TEDC withdrew from USC's capacity building fund-
ing program for technical assistance and operating expenses because Simmons felt that
it was not worth the effort to obtain a relatively small grant (Simmons 1999a, 1999b).
Similarly, TEDC did not apply for the state's Community7 Development Assistance
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grants, which required that a CDC select a majority of the members of its board of
directors by an election open to all residents of its community. The board of
directors had long been a problem at TEDC. When TEDC was first organized,
board members of the founding organization, Belafonte Tacolcy, refused at the
crucial moment to sign the contract to develop and manage Edison Plaza because
they were afraid they would be liable for $2 million— despite Pitts's repeated efforts
to explain that the liability insurance would cover them and that the federal govern-
ment was financing most of the project Later, a board member who owned a drug
store at Edison Plaza stopped paying rent, and Simmons had to remove him from
the board. A political member of the board who wanted the business owner's sup-
port fought to keep him on the board, causing a struggle in which Pitts became
involved. To avoid further problems, Pitts reorganized the TEDC board and
carefully chose its members for expertise rather than community representation (a
type of board common to non-community- based nonprofit organizations) (Pitts
1999; Rosenblith 1999).
CHANGE IN STRATEGY
Pitts and Simmons felt that the decision to withdraw from Miami's community
development programs was an easy one to make because government, philan-
thropic, and intermediary agencies offered CDCs little financial support. The agen-
cies, according to Pitts, gave relatively little "soft money" to cover the operating
expenses of CDCs, preferring instead to lend money for projects. Although Miami
USC initially recruited energetic business leaders to channel money into commu-
nity development, Pitts felt that IiSC never did raise as much money in Miami as
it did in rich community development environments elsewhere. He noted that the
amount of money available to CDCs declined further as corporate leaders died or
departed and pro-community-development political officials left office. In addi-
tion, TEDC's officers knew that the Ford Foundation was planning to reduce its
contributions to Miami's CDCs, which meant that in 1997 TEDC would lose
some or all of its annual $200,000 operating subsidy (Pitts 1999; Simmons 1999b).
To cope with the financial pressures of the organization's substantial debts, staff
salaries, and overhead, Pitts and Simmons pursued a new strategy to earn revenue.
In the new approach TEDC would form partnerships to carry out large-scale hous-
ing development at sites outside Liberty City. Pitts had long admired private sector
companies for their ability to develop housing without government and philan-
thropic grants, and now hoped to work with and emulate them (Pitts 1999).
Pitts and Simmons learned from the private developers whom they consulted that
large-scale housing development projects (more than 100 units) produced revenue
more efficiently than small-scale projects. Pitts believed that intermediary program
officers preferred small-scale projects because they felt these were easier to finance
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and cany out, but experience had taught TEDC's leaders that expenses in small projects
outstripped income. Edison Gardens, for example, incurred high fixed costs from
Miami's property taxes and insurance rates (which soared after the hurricane in 1992),
but TEDC could not raise rents in Liberty City's stagnant real estate market. As a result,
Pitts and Simmons shifted to a policy of developing housing on a large scale (Pitts
1999: Simmons 1999b).
liberty7 City, TEDC's home base, however, lacked lots large enough to accommodate
the size of the housing development the organization planned. To develop housing
on a large scale, TEDC was forced to find sites in the outlying neighborhoods of the
city and beyond in the towns to the south. Government agencies and philanthropies
provided TEDC with another incentive to develop outside liberty City by making
funds available to rebuild areas in southern Dade County that were damaged by
Hurricane Andrew (Pitts 1999; Simmons 1999b).
In 1994 Simmons completed the first housing development project in the new joint-
venaire, large-scale strategy he and Pitts had begun. TEDC and Related Group of
Florida, a for-profit housing development and management concern, developed 290
rental units at Walden Pond Villas for approximately $15 million. The units are several
miles north of liberty City near the Miami border (Simmons 1999d). In contrast to
the multiple lenders CDCs must use to finance their housing projects, only three
sources provided the outside funding for Walden Pond Villas: a bank that provided a
$7 million mortgage; the HOME loan program administered by Dade County, which
provided three mortgages totaling about $33 million; and a syndicator and limited
partner, which raised $4.8 million worth of equity by the sale of tax credits (Simmons
1999d; Walden Pond Associates 1994).
The Walden Pond Villas project, according to Simmons, was extraordinarily rewarding
for TEDC. TEDC earned developers' overhead costs, developers' fees, profit from
construction, a percentage of the management fee after its partner Related Group had
taken its share, and general partnership fees after the project
cash flow. More-over, TEDC's for-profit partner gave the organization immediate
access to large sums of capital, which normally TEDC could assemble only with great
difficulty. Although the partners were theoretically equal, in the early stages of the cteal
Related Capital invested $800,000 in Walden Pond Villas, and TEDC only $110,000.
Even with such a small stake, Simmons recalls agonizing over the negotiations before
the deal was approved lest TEDC lose its $110,000 (Simmons 1999b).
The for-profit partner derived benefits from the alliance also. By having a nonprofit
organization on an application for low-income housing tax credits, the commercial
company in the partnership earned precious points that might make the difference
between winning or losing the valuable credits. Moreover, nonprofit community-
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based housing development organizations were eligible for the low-interest loans
of the HOME program. The savings for the partnership were significant. The
partnership converted the $7 million construction loan into a bank mortgage bear-
ing interest at 8 percent. In contrast, the first HOME mortgage (worth $1.3 mil-
lion) did not become due until the partnership had received a 10 percent return on
its equity and then only at 6 percent, the second HOME mortgage ($480,000) was
payable at 5.8 percent, and the third ($1.5 million) had a trifling 1.5 percent interest
rate (Walden Pond Associates 1994).
After the success of the Walden Pond Villas project, Simmons led TEDC into a
series of joint-venture developments in south Dade County, making use of the
funding that had become available for low-income housing in areas affected by the
hurricane. As it had in the Walden Pond Villas project, TEDC formed partnerships
with for-profit companies and used the federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
program. As before, the for-profit companies looked to TEDC to help obtain tax
credits and acquire government soft money set aside for nonprofit organizations.
In six projects executed between 1995 and 1996 in the Florida towns of Florida
City, Homestead, Goulds, and Naranja, TEDC helped develop 1,062 units of
housing at a total development cost of $67.3 million. Each of these developments
had more than 100 units; together the projects averaged 177 units and $ 11.22 mil-
lion per project (TEDC 1999). Unlike the lucrative arrangements in its first joint
venture deal, however, TEDC usually had only a 30 to 40 percent interest in each
project—as opposed to the 50 percent stake it had in Walden Pond Villas—and
with a couple of exceptions did not receive the kinds of fees it earned in the Walden
Pond Villas project (Sim-mons 1999d).
Since 1997, when TEDC lost the grants from the Ford Foundation and Dade
Partnership, Simmons has run the organization without major operating support
from foundations, government, or intermediaries. Because of the organization's
debts and financial commitments, he reduced the number of full-time staff from
six to three, but has continued to pursue projects, including a 220-unit, $15.5
million joint venture development in north-west Miami and two single-family
home projects in south Dade County (TEDC 1999).
Although committed to TEDC's strategy of joint-venture, large-scale projects,
Simmons has not closed the door on USC or the conventional community devel-
opment model of operations. He bears no ill will toward USC, and gratefully
acknowledges its past help. From 1996 to 1998 TEDC enrolled all its apartment
properties in a USC youth program, and Simmons does not rule out working with
USC in the future. Simmons would gladly see TEDC carry out deals by itself if
money for predevelopment costs was available and it was fortunate enough to
score high on the low-income housing tax credit applK^on and receive 100 percent
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of the allocation. Meanwhile, however, he thinks that to survive in Miami other CDCs
may want to emulate TEDC and work with for-profit partners (Simmons 1999b).
THE USC PERSPECTIVE
Beneath the particular issues related to the Edison Gardens work-out and the require-
ments for participating in funding programs lies a basic conflict between TEDC and
USC over the proper approach to community development. LISC's program officers,
like most people active in the community development movement, subscribe to the
principle that CDCs should carry out programs within or adjacent to a circumscribed
service area. USC had enthusiastically supported and contributed significant sums of
money to Edison Gardens and TEDC's other housing projects in Liberty City. When
TEDC began to pursue projects outside Liberty City, LISC's Sandra Rosenblith argued
at length with Lorenzo Simmons to convince him to reverse TEDC's decision.
Rosenblith objected to the policy because she felt it diverted too much of TEDC's
organizational effort away from neighborhood projects. Rosenblith also believed that
when CDCs carry out projects in unfamiliar markets and fail to pursue comprehensive
development strategies, they lose their competitive advantage over private developers
(Rosenblith 1999). It was essential, as Rosenblith expressed it, "to take care of your
knitting at home first." Even if no fee income was immediately available, she believed,
the staff of CDCs should tackle projects that would directly help the people of their
neighborhoods. In Rosenblith's view, money would somehow7 be found for CDCs
carrying out worthwhile projects (Rosenblith 1999).
CDCs, according to that reasoning, should not choose projects merely to maintain
themselves. A group can pursue deals outside the neighborhood, but unless all the
money earned from those deals was returned to neighborhood projects, Rosenblith
believed, the outside revenues wrere probably maintaining the organization only, not
the neighborhood. Sharing these tenets, long-time observers of the Miami commu-
nity development scene such as Ernest Martin criticize TEDC for not basing its opera-
tions in Liberty City and for not having a long-term strategy for its service area (Martin
1999; Rosenblith 1999).
Another important principle of the community development movement is that non-
profit organizations, as opposed to businesses, are best suited for carrying out com-
munity development. USC officials and staff (as well as foundation officers and
government officials) strongly believe that although community development projects
should be economically viable, they should be projects that the private market will not
undertake. In low-income neighborhoods in which there is little investment, activities
such as housing or retail projects, job training, and after-school tutoring programs do
not generate enough income to pay for themselves. Only when and wiiere such activi-
ties provide a significant rate of return will the private market implement them. CDCs,
according to community development advocates, lay the groundwork for the private
102J
Cornell Real Estate Journal
June 2002
market to return to such low-income neighborhoods. Thus, until we have eliminated
poverty, Rosenblith believes, we will always need to support CDCs with operating
subsidies. Observers of Miami's CDCs, such as Rosenblith and Martin, worry that
TEDC lacks a method in its choice of projects and behaves like a private business by
undertaking projects simply to make money (Martin 1999; Rosenblith 1999).
Both Pitts and Simmons reject the assertions of critics who feel that in the location of
its projects and the selection process for its board of directors, TEDC has forsaken its
community, Liberty City. Otis Pitts grew up in Liberty City and his parents still live
there. He is held in high esteem by most residents of the neighborhood, who have
supported his many endeavors to improve the area. Pitts scoffs at the criticism that the
method of selecting the board—a method he put in place to allow TEDC to be
effective—makes it unresponsive to its community. He notes that from the first TEDC
surveyed people along the Seventh Avenue corridor and in the neighborhood about
their needs and studied the demographics and market carefully and objectively to
ensure that the projects would be successful. Pitts feels he listened to the community's
wishes, but also resisted ideas—such as hiring unqualified local people—that would
alienate lenders and doom TEDC's projects. Simmons points out that there is a
continuity between TEDC's Liberty City and Dade County housing developments
because the great majority of tenants in projects outside Liberty City, like those in the
Liberty City projects, are African American (Pitts 1999; Simmons 1999b).
TEDC's leaders insist that the organization is continuing to help improve liberty City.
Simmons and Moses Florence, a real estate agent and TEDC board member, point
out that TEDC uses funds it earns from its development deals outside Liberty City to
sustain its projects in Liberty City. The moneys from Walden Pond Villas and the
south Dade County projects helped keep Edison Gardens afloat and can be used to
redevelop Edison Plaza as well as help the organization develop a site across the street
from Edison Plaza for a new Walgreens drug store (Florence 1999; Simmons 1999b).
Pitts and Simmons cheerfully admit that they are "deal-driven." As Pitts explains, a
small nonprofit group that produces a few dwelling units can survive on CDBG funds
from local government and foundation grants, but an organization such as TEDC,
which pays for 80 percent or more of its operations from its projects, needs to pursue
deals that will produce income. Pitts is working on his own in Liberty City to develop
a large office building that would have a government agency as primary tenant and that,
along with transportation improvements, he hopes will encourage further investment
in the neighborhood. He approves of any project that stimulates further real estate
development and business growth in an inner-city neighborhood such as Liberty City,
whether that project is carried out by a nonprofit or for-profit entity. And like Robert
Moore, the director of Development Corporation of Columbia Heights in Washing-
ton, DC, Pitts believes that once the goal of an economically viable neighborhood is
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achieved, the local CDC can go out of business (Pitts 1999).
It is interesting to note that unlike TEDC, two of Miami's most successful CDCs
pursue the conventional means of community development, but cope differently
with the stringent Miami political environment. East little Havana CDC has worked
within its Cuban and Central American neighborhood. It has pursued mostly
homeownership condominium developments, in part because tax credits for rental
projects are difficult for CDCs to obtain in Miami. Lowr appraised values limit the
revenues a developer can earn, however, so the projects barely break even after grants are
injected into them. Opalocka CDC has built small homes, rehabilitated abandoned
houses, and constructed rental apartment complexes in and adjacent to its large pre-
dominantly African-American service area in northwTestern Dade County. Opalocka
CDC is currently planning housing projects with a range of partners—including a
government agency, a nonprofit CDC, and for-profit companies. In contrast to TEDC,
both CDCs elect community residents to their boards; accept operating support from
city, state, and county governments, foundations, and the Dade Partnership for Com-
munity7 Economic Development; and wrork closely with LJSC (East Little Havana
CDC 1998; Opa-locka CDC 1998,1999; Rodriguez-Tejera 1999; Williams-Baldwin
1999).
Meanwhile, TEDC has three more housing projects (two of which are made up of
houses for sale) outside Liberty City- under way and has begun construction of the
Walgreens commercial retail development in Liberty City. It continues to run its opera-
tions without benefit of grants Iran government, foundation, or intermediary sources.
CONCLUSION
The relationship between a CDC and an intermediary could hardly have been closer
than the relationship between TEDC and USC during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Through Sandra Rosenblith, USC introduced the idea of community development
to Otis Pitts, helped him found TEDC, and worked unusually closely with Pitts and
his station several development projects, even suggesting the site where Edison
Towers and Edison Gardens would be built.
At first, as in the other case study locales, LISC program officers and CDC staff
members in Miami shared common community development goals and strategies.
LJSCs Rosenblith and her successor Raley and TEDC's Pitts and his successor Simmons
all wanted to help revive the Liberty City neighborhood through real estate develop-
ment and related projects.
As was true of other CDCs, long-term goals and immediate circumstances dictated
TEDC's short-term strategy7 of developing Edison Gaidens. After the successful Edison
Plaza commercial development, Pitts decided TEDC should produce attractive hous-
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ing that Liberty City's low income residents could afford. With Rosenblith's help, he
found an available site to build Edison Gardens and funds from various sources,
including the new7 Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program.
Until then the arrangement had been progressing smoothly. But the parties making
the deal—TEDC, LISC, and NEF—erred in underwriting the project. Edison Gar-
dens carried a great amount of debt per unit. In addition to its financing problems,
TEDC fumbled the management of the property. Rent delinquencies and problem
tenants bled money from a project that could not afford the loss. Such problems in
underwriting and management are not uncommon in the community development
field and call for further research that builds on this case and the groundbreaking work
ofBrattetal.(1995).
The mistakes made in planning and managing Edison Gardens (combined with
TEDC's other financial problems) soured the relationship between TEDC and LISC.
At the surface level, personal reactions to the mutual efforts to rescue Edison Gardens
caused the discord. LISC and NEF officers grew frustrated with TEDC's decisions
regarding the management of Edison Gardens and with the slow way the organiza-
tion moved to correct its mistakes. TEDC staff members, particularly Director Simmons,
felt that the representatives of the intermediary and its equity arm were not treating
them with the respect due experienced CDC directors. Finally Simmons decided that
he did not wish to submit to the program requirements of the intermediaries and
government community development agencies.
At a more fundamental level, however, the political environment of south Florida
encouraged TEDC's deviation from orthodox community development. Unlike other
cities, Miami had never developed the proto-CDCs—neighborhood organizations
that were formed to fight urban renewal and poverty and that then became interested
in real estate development. As a result, nonprofit community development came late
to Miami, and when it did, agencies such as LISC and The Enterprise Foundation were
not able to build as strong a community development system as they did in other
cities. Miami still lacks a large number of influential individuals—especially within
government—who understand and enthusiastically support local nonprofit organiza-
tions and who can help channel the efforts of these organizations to improve their
communities. If those kinds of individuals had come to the fore, according to a
veteran of the community development scene, the unproductive CDCs would have
been winnowed out and the productive CDCs would have received more financial and
technical assistance (Martin 1999). In a system that provided more sources of operat-
ing and project funds to nonprofit developers, TEDC might well have stayed on a
more conventional course of community development.
If support for the nonprofit community development system was weak in Miami,
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for-profit entrepreneurial polices were popular. After the riots of the 1980s Miami's
government and civic leaders encouraged business entrepreneurs as a way of reviving
low-income communities, and many still support that approach. Although TEDC
continued to be a nonprofit organization, it adopted a strategy in keeping with the
entrepreneurial ethos by forming partnerships with for-profit real estate firms.
TEDC's leaders, Pitts and Simmons, admired the business world in general and
supported the concept of black capitalism in particular—both of those sentiments
were in accord with the prevailing political philosophies in Miami. More to the point,
the revenues TEDC earned from joint ventures with for-profit firms allowed its
leaders to forgo the support of foundations, intermediaries, and government com-
munity development agencies. TEDC wanted to join forces with private for-profit
firms to enjoy the advantages that government programs such as the Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit gave large real estate companies. This entrepreneurial strategy
required undertaking profitable large-scale housing developments, and the best sites
for such projects were in areas remote from the neighborhood of Liberty City.
Both for-profit partnerships and the choice of a remote location for development
projects contradicted main tenets of the community development movement. The
program officers at LJSC—and at other community development intermediary and
governmental agencies— could tolerate TEDC's partnerships with commercial firms
on the grounds of expediency, but they could not accept the location of the joint-
venture housing projects far from TEDC's base. USC officers fervently believe that
locally based organizations should consult the local populace and carry out projects
locally; the idea is the bedrock of their concept of community development.
Hence, the directors of TEDC and the officers of USC found themselves in a funda-
mental conflict. In the conflict the CDC and the intermediary took sides opposite from
what critics of community development would have expected them to take. When
TEDC's direaor placed a higher priority on housing development outside the neigh-
borhood, LISC operatives insisted that the CDC expand its programs in liberty City.
Ultimately, all organizations engaged in housing and community development in
Miami have been forced to find ways to manage without a strong support system. In
the 1980s intermediaries such as LJSC took on the task of trying to re-create in Miami
the conditions conducive to community development that existed in cities such as
Boston. They made some headway, but so far have been unable to aieate a permanently
strong community development support system. In the absence of effective help for
nonprofit organizations, the rival entrepreneurial approach vied for the support of
policy makers and practitioners. Thus, the case of TEDC and the Edison Gardens
project teaches that with-out a strong system of support, a strictly nonprofit approach
to urban revitalization may not always prevail.
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